










A	 Commentary	 on	 the	 Meaning	 of	 Objective	 Good	
Faith	 in	 the	 Translex	 Principles	 through	















Despite	 its	 numerous	 enunciations,	 the	 meaning	 of	 objective	 good	 faith	
remains	obscure.	The	usual	manner	in	which	legal	scholars	have	attempted	
to	 provide	 for	 such	 meaning	 is	 by	 presenting	 a	 definition	 of	 the	 general	




findings	 of	 economic	 institutionalism,	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 transaction	
costs	 that	 potentially	 arise	 in	 context	 of	wide	 information	 asymmetries,	 at	




to	 bad	 faith.	 In	 this	 sense,	 objective	 good	 faith	 is	 identified	with	 a	 general	
legal	institution,	the	aim	of	which	is	precisely	to	limit	opportunistic	behavior.	
From	it	more	specialized	legal	institutions	are	born,	its	concretization	being	
possible	 partly	 possible	 by	 the	 practice	 of	 international	 arbitration,	
contributing	thusly	to	transnational	law.	
 












Apesar	 de	 seus	 numerosos	 enunciados,	 o	 significado	 da	 boa-fé	 objetiva	
permanece	 obscuro.	 A	 maneira	 usual	 pela	 qual	 os	 juristas	 têm	 tentado	
fornecer	esse	significado	é	apresentando	uma	definição	do	princípio	geral	de	
boa	 fé	 em	 termos	 mais	 gerais,	 como	 justiça.	 A	 boa-fé	 objetiva,	 conforme	
apresentada	nos	Princípios	Translex,	não	escapa	desse	problema.	A	presente	
reflexão	teórica	tenta	 identificar	tal	significado	nesta	codificação	particular.	
Isso	 se	 dará	 por	 meio	 das	 constatações	 do	 institucionalismo	 econômico,	
atentando-se	 para	 os	 custos	 de	 transação	 que	 potencialmente	 surgem	 em	
contextos	 de	 amplas	 assimetrias	 de	 informação.	 Portanto,	 a	 redução	 dessa	





fundamento	 jurídico	 geral,	 cujo	 objetivo	 é	 justamente	 limitar	 o	














costs	 that	potentially	arise	 in	context	of	wide	 information	asymmetries,	at	which	point,	 it	 is	
the	 objective	 of	 institutions	 to	 reduce	 these	 costs.	 In	 such	 contexts	 –of	which	 international	
commercial	 transactions	 are	 a	 prime	 example-	 there	 is	 a	 high	 propensity	 to	 opportunistic	
behavior.	 There	 is	 a	 demand	 for	 a	 legal	 institution	 that	 are	 able	 to	 curtail	 opportunistic	




Even	 though	 the	 findings	of	 this	work	pertain	principally	 to	 the	Principles,	 they	 can	be	
applied	 to	additional	 transnational	commerce	 law	–such	as	 the	UNIDROIT	Principles	or	any	











It	 should	 be	 mentioned,	 however,	 that	 this	 paper	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 a	 detailed	
discussion,	nor	an	explanation,	on	the	specific	process	through	which	international	appointed	
arbitrators	 create	 new	 rules	 using	 the	 objective	 good	 faith	 clause.	 Its	 objective	 is	 more	
moderate,	inasmuch	as	it	presents	both	the	meaning	of	objective	good	faith	in	the	Principles,	
and	 argues	 that,	 without	 it,	 international	 arbitration	 could	 not	 contribute	 to	 transnational	
commercial	 law	 –which,	 controversial	 as	 it	 may	 be,	 it	 does.	 The	 emphasis	 of	 this	 work	 is	
placed	 rather	 on	 the	 critical	 importance	 of	 the	 open	 rule	 that	 is	 the	 objective	 good	 faith	
provision	 in	 the	Principles	 in	 the	expected	contribution	 to	 transnational	commercial	 law	on	
the	 side	 of	 international	 arbitration.	 In	 this	 sense,	 this	 work	 opens	 the	 door	 for	 further	
research.	
Beyond	this	brief	introduction,	the	concept	of	objective	good	faith	will	be	presented	as	a	




international	 transnational	 commercial	 law	 codifications	 efforts	 such	 as	 the	 Principles,	 and	





To	 the	 question	 of	 what	 are	 the	 principles	 and	 rules	 composing	 what	 has	 come	 to	 be	
known	as	the	New	Law	Merchant	(henceforth,	NLM),	the	Translex	creeping	codification	of	the	






to	 be	 observed	 during	 all	 contract	 stages	 -the	 negotiation,	 formation,	 performance,	 and	
interpretation	of	the	contract	(Berger,	2019).	
Primarily	 in	 civil	 law	 systems,	 objective	 good	 faith	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 not	 taking	
advantage	of	a	contractual	position	in	situations	that	might	lend	itself	to	it	(Mackaay,	2012,	p.	
154).	As	 a	key	 concept,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 a	principle	 capable	of	 creating,	modifying	and	













a	 general	 term	 into	 other	 general	 terms	 to	 which	 without	 question	 objective	 good	 faith	 is	
related	-such	as	fairness	and	honesty.	As	an	apparent	principle,	objective	good	faith	appears	
to	be	capable	of	justifying	almost	any	rule	of	contract	law.	Such	could	be	the	case	of	§242	BGB,	
according	 to	which	an	obligor	has	a	duty	 to	perform	according	to	 the	requirements	of	good	
faith.	As	a	general	provision,	it	suffuses	all	the	law	of	the	contract	(Heinrich,	2006;	Hennrichs,	
1995;	 Wieacker,	 1956).	 Furthermore,	 having	 no	 clear	 enough	 meaning	 could	 lead	 to	 the	
conclusion,	 that	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 general	 mold,	 a	 sort	 of	 open	 rule,	 in	 which	 more	 specific	
doctrines	 can	 be	 cast,	 then	 to	 assume	 an	 independent	 existence	within	 the	 positive	 law	 of	
different	 legal	 systems	 (Mackaay,	 2012,	 p.	 159)	 –and	 within	 codifications	 of	 transnational	
commercial	law	such	as	the	UNIDROIT	principles.	










and	 qualify	 other	 specific	 legal	 rules	 and	 contract	 terms	 (Summers,	 1968,	 p.	 198).	 If	 it	 is	
admitted	 for	 the	sake	of	argument,	 that	 judges	do	 in	 fact	have	a	duty	 to	create	 legal	rules	–
regardless	of	the	clarity	of	this	duty,	by	invoking	good	faith,	it	may	be	possible	for	judges	to	do	
justice	 in	a	contract	relationship,	 in	which	one	of	 the	parties	has	taken	unduly	advantage	of	
the	other	one	precisely	in	a	situation	that	has	lend	itself	to	it;	and	in	which	strict	compliance	of	
the	wording	of	the	contract	would	result	in	an	absurd	outcome	-like	inefficient	risk	allocation.	
Without	 such	 a	 resource,	 justice	 might	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	 judge,	 as	 the	 case	 analyst,	 but	
probably	at	the	cost	of	raising	uncertainty	for	future	legal	cases,	as	the	rule	would	not	logically	
derive	 from	 any	 graspable	 principle	 (Summers,	 1968,	 p.	 198).	 Notwithstanding,	 when	 the	







prices,	 high	 quality	 partners	would	 see	 themselves	 forced	 to	 copy	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	 low	 price	 suppliers,	which	 could	 entail	
offering	goods	and	services	of	a	 lower	quality.	Hence,	high	quality	potential	business	partners	are	squished	out	of	 the	market,	
















the	 buyer.	 From	 the	 language	 of	 the	 case,	 or	 its	 facts,	 it	 could	 be	 that	 the	 judge	 is	 actually	












should	be	 interpreted	 in	a	way	 in	which	each	party	has	the	obligation	to	display	a	behavior	
toward	the	other	one,	which	cannot	harm	it,	having	this	one	formed	reasonable	expectations	
about	the	performance	of	that	one.	Furthermore,	the	parties	have	to	display	a	normal	degree	
of	 honesty	 and	 sincerity,	 which	 is	 reasonable	 for	 the	 safeguard	 of	 the	 party’s	 interests,	
particularly	 in	 trying	 not	 to	 act	 in	 a	way	 that	 potentially	 is	 to	 unduly	 surprise	 or	 to	 inflict	
damages	to	the	other	party	(Trans-Lex,	2019).	The	rule	also	prescribes	that	the	standards	and	










While	 useful,	 the	 approach	 consisting	 in	 understanding	 objective	 good	 faith	 as	 an	
excluder	still	begs	the	question	of	operational	meaning	for	bad	faith.	Let	us	say	from	the	start,	





















party	 is	used	within	 the	 reasonable	contemplation	of	 the	parties	at	 the	moment	of	 contract	
formation.	 In	other	words,	acting	 in	good	 faith	 is	equivalent	 to	capturing	opportunities	 that	





that	 the	 promisor	 used	 his	 discretion	 to	 recapture	 said	 forgone	 opportunities	 –while	
complying	 with	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 contract(Burton,	 2017,	 p.	 378;	 Houh,	 2003,	 p.	 22).	
Independently	of	how	this	discretion	is	conferred	upon(Burton,	2017,	p.	380),	the	dependent	
party	must	rely	on	the	good	faith	of	the	other,	controlling	party.	Only	in	such	cases,	the	judge	
can	 expressly	 invoke	 the	 implied	 covenant	 of	 good	 faith,	 or	 interpret	 a	 contract	 in	 light	 of	
good	faith	performance.4	




turn,	 bad	 faith	 consists	 in	 an	 exercise	 of	 discretion	 in	 performance	 to	 recapture	 forgone	
opportunities	 at	 the	 moment	 in	 which	 the	 contract	 is	 formed.	 The	 expectations	 of	 the	
dependent	party	encompass	both	the	subject	matter	to	be	received	under	a	contract,	and	the	
expected	 costs	 of	 performance	 by	 the	 other	 party.	 A	 recapture	 by	 one	 party	 of	 forgone	







a	 breach	 of	 contract.	 It	 would	 only	 be	 such,	 if	 in	 important	 aspects	 it	 resembles	 a	 breach	 by	 failing	 to	 perform	 as	 expressly	
stipulated	in	the	contract.	











In	 contract	 law,	bad	 faith	 can	be	 equated	 to	opportunism;	 and	good	 faith	 to	 abstention	
from	opportunistic	behavior	(Muris,	1980,	p.	566)5.	The	key	here	is	to	focus	on	the	involuntary	









such	 as:	 free	 riding,	 shirking,	 agency	 problems	 (Carnahan,	 Agarwal,	 &	 Campbell,	 2008,	 pp.	
1451–1563),	 moral	 hazard	 (MacKenzie,	 Ohndorf,	 &	 Palmer,	 2012,	 pp.	 350–374),	 etc.	
Institutionalism	 places	 opportunism	 in	 an	 important,	 central	 role.	Williamson	 defines	 it	 as	
self-interest	 seeking	 with	 guile	 (1985,	 pp.	 64–67);	 a	 concept	 opposed	 to	 trust,	 and	 closely	
linked	 with	 partial	 disclosure	 of	 critical	 information,	 with	 uncertainty,	 with	 bounded	
rationality;	and	with	self-disbelieved	promises	about	the	opportunist’s	own	future	conduct.	It	
is	an	effort	to	realize	individual	gains	through	a	lack	honesty	in	transactions,	being	the	most	
common	 form	 the	 strategic	 disclosure	 of	 asymmetrically	 distributed	 information	 by	
individuals	to	their	advantage	(Williamson,	1973,	p.	317).	
The	reason	why	good	faith	is	to	be	observed	during	all	stages	of	an	international	contract,	
within	the	Principles,	 is	because	opportunism	potentially	affects	all	of	 them,	and	hence,	 it	 is	
one	particular	phenomenon	with	which	 contract	 law	 should	 concern	 itself	 (Cohen,	 1992,	 p.	
957).	If	opportunistic	behavior	is	left	unchecked,	it	would	lead	to	all	potential	contract	parties	
to	 raise	 their	 guards,	 taking	 more	 extensive	 measure	 against	 becoming	 victims	 of	
opportunistic	 behavior.	 The	 ultimate	 precaution	would	 be	 forgoing	 the	 contract	 altogether,	
which	 is	 surely	 the	 costliest	 option.	 If	 such	 choice	 is	 adopted	 by	 many	 contractors	 at	 an	
international	 level,	 this	 would	 shrink	 the	 market.	 Precautionary	 measures	 short	 from	
abstaining	 from	 contracting	 are	 wasteful	 relative	 to	 social	 welfare.	 Defending	 against	
opportunistic	 behavior	 is	 a	 primary	 responsibility	 of	 the	 contracting	 parties.	 Certain	 legal	
systems	 could,	 however,	 be	 useful	 by	 allowing	 contracting	 parties	 to	 reduce	 their	 self-
protection	and	loss-absorption	costs.	Where,	and	if,	this	can	be	accomplished	at	a	cost	of	the	
rule	itself	and	its	enforcement	that	is	lower	than	the	savings	generated,	we	could	expect	such	
gains	 where	 public	 authorities	 have	 access	 to	 greater	 scale	 economies	 in	 framing	 and	
enforcing	rules	that	are	open	to	private	actors	(Mackaay,	2012,	p.	166).	
 



















which	a	party	may	avoid	the	contract	when	 it	has	been	 led	to	conclude	 it	by	the	other	party's	
fraudulent	 representation,	 including	 language	 or	 practices,	 or	 fraudulent	 non-disclosure	 of	
circumstances	which,	according	to	reasonable	commercial	standards	of	fair	dealing,	the	latter	
party	should	have	disclosed.	Reference	is	being	made	here	to	the	basic	idea	of	opportunism	in	
terms	 of	 strategically	 failing	 to	 disclose	 asymmetrically	 distributed	 critical	 pieces	 of	
information	 (Williamson,	1973,	p.	 317).	 In	 it,	 the	party	has	 the	 right	 to	 step	aside	 from	 the	
contract,	 which	 he	 would	 never	 have	 enter	 it,	 had	 he	 not	 been	 deceived	 by	 erroneous	 or	
incomplete	information	provided	by	the	other	party.	
The	example	of	 fraud	 is	appropriate	 if	 it	 is	 thought	of	as:	aiming	 to	deter	opportunistic	
behavior	by	manipulation	of	the	information	by	one	of	the	parties.	Accepting	opportunism	as	
the	 reasoning	 underlying	 fraud,	 for	 instance,	 directs	 attention	 to	 new	 factual	 patterns	 that	
might	 be	 relevant	 to	 curtail	 opportunism,	 as	 other	 individual	 actions	 could	be	 identified	 as	
related	to	such	patterns.	By	doing	this,	as	new	cases	are	presented	to	courts	and	to	codifiers	–





boundaries,	 contributing	 to	 the	 broad	 legal	 objective	 of	 curtailing	 opportunism	 (Mackaay,	
2012,	p.	168),	while	providing	for	important	limitations	for	discretionary	decision	making	by	
the	judiciary.	Institutions	such	as	laesio	enormis,	fraud	or	culpa	in	contrahendo	are	important	
elements	of	such	 inner	system,	on	account	 that	are	derived	 from	the	general	clause	of	good	
faith.	
However,	 occasions	 may	 arise	 where	 the	 opportunistic	 behavior	 being	 faced	 is	 not	
covered	by	any	of	the	elements	within	the	inner	system	-as	developed	so	far	in	positive	law.	
For	 such	occasions,	 it	 becomes	useful	 to	 count	on	an	open-ended	 concept,	 capable	of	being	
applied,	as	a	last	resort	to	new	forms	of	opportunism.	The	duty	of	good	faith	plays	precisely	
this	 last	resource	 function.	The	duty	to	act	 in	good	faith	 is	applied	as	a	rule	of	 last	resort	 in	
exceptional	cases,	in	the	expectation	that	this	will	lead	in	due	course	to	the	crystallization	of	a	



















provision	 itself.	 Hence	 no	 clear	 logical	 deduction	 can	 be	 advanced	with	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 a	
logical	 conclusion,	 presenting	 a	 legal	 consequence	 deriving	 from	 a	 set	 of	 facts.	
Notwithstanding,	 it	 is	 in	fact	a	rule	-an	open	rule.	 Its	content,	 the	elements	that	compose	its	
inner	system,	cannot	be	established	in	an	abstract	manner,	but	with	the	attention	placed	on	
the	circumstances	of	the	cases	analyzed,	and	through	concretization	(Hesselink,	2004,	p.	622).	
Being	 an	 open	 rule,	 what	 really	matters	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 good	 faith	 is	 applied	 by	 case	






historically	 a	 mouthpiece	 through	 which	 new	 legal	 rules	 are	 created,	 which	 would	 be	
illustrated	by	the	example	of	laesio	enormis,	or	culpa	in	contrahendo.	










objective	 good	 faith,	 which	 are:	 supplementation	 of	 duties;	 limitation	 of	 rights;	 correction	
(Wegfall	der	Geschäftsgrundlagen);	and	interpretation7.	Concerning	the	groups	of	cases,	these	
gather	various	stages	of	 the	contractual	process,	 such	as	 formation;	 interpretation;	 content;	
and	 performance.	 From	 these,	 the	 result	 has	 been	 a	 variety	 of	well-established	 legal	 forms	












Adding	 the	 above	 mentioned	 elements	 that	 provide	 objective	 good	 faith	 with	 internal	
structure,	among	others,	it	is	worth	mentioning	culpa	in	contrahendo	(Kessler	&	Fine,	1964);	





of	German	and	Colombian	 law8,	 as	well	as	 in	 the	compilations	such	as	 the	Principles-	 it	has	
been	 discussed	 how	 this	 can	 become	 problematic.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 may	 give	 wide	
discretion	to	judges,	which	may	be	used	to	import	ideology	into	contract	law,	or	to	promote	
personal	opinions	of	their	own.	On	the	other	hand,	it	may	also	foster	judicial	activism,	which	is	
particularly	 problematic	 in	 civil	 law	 countries	 (Arnull,	 2013).	 Judges	 may	 develop	 the	 law	









Regarding	the	applications	that	 judges	make	of	good	faith,	 taking	 into	consideration	the	
case	groups	 identified	by	 legal	 scholars,	 and	 its	different	 functions,	 it	has	been	argued,	 that	
judges	civil	 law	countries	have	felt	traditionally	uncomfortable	with	their	role	as	creators	of	
legal	 rules,	 and	 not	merely	 applicators	 of	 them.	However,	when	 they	 do	 produce	 decisions	
based	on	good	faith,	this	general	clause	is	used	as	a	cover	for	such	new	creations.	Judges,	 in	
this	sense,	do	create	new	rules,	in	spite	their	uneasiness.	If	the	role	of	the	judge	as	a	creator	of	





It	 could	be	argued	 that	 the	 situation	 in	 international	 trade	 is	precisely	one	 in	which,	 in	
some	cases,	 international	arbitrators	are	expected	 to	contribute	 to	 the	 transnational	 rule	of	
law	by	creating	a	rule	that	supplements,	for	instance,	the	will	of	the	parties	expressed	initially	
in	the	contract.	What	is	specially	characteristic	of	the	Principles	is	that	they	rely	heavily	on	the	
notion	of	 the	Creeping	Codification	of	 transnational	commercial	 law:	 “a	non-exhaustive,	open	
 
8	 In	 article	 1603	 of	 the	 Colombian	 Civil	 Code,	 objective	 good	 faith	 is	mentioned	 also	 as	 a	 –particularly-	 broad	 concept,	 being	
presented	without	 any	 explanation	 of	 its	meaning.	 According	 to	 it,	 a	 contract	must	 be	 executed	 in	 good	 faith.	 In	 line	with	 its	
discussed	capacity	to	create,	to	modify	and	to	extinguish	obligations,	parties	are	not	only	subject	to	the	wording	of	the	contract,	
but	also	“to	all	the	things	that	emanate	precisely	of	the	nature	of	the	obligation,	or	that	by	law	pertain	to	it.”	








list	 of	 principles	 and	 rules	 of	 the	 New	 Lex	 Mercatoria	 that	 is	 constantly	 updated	 but	 never	
completed	 (Berger,	 2019;	 Trans-Lex,	 2019).”	 Its	 most	 striking	 and	 noticeable	 feature	 is	 its	
dynamism.	 And	 operating	 on	 this	 particular	 premise,	 such	 constant,	 never-ending	 effort	
clearly	 must	 be	 heavily	 based	 on	 what	 international	 arbitration	 tribunals	 produce	 when	




















It	 remains	 arguable	 if	 all	 kinds	 of	 arbitration	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 produce	 legal	 rules,	
taking	 into	 consideration	 some	 aspects	 of	 its	 current	 practice.10	 However,	 as	 Weidemaier	
(2010,	p.	1899)	argues,	“although	not	every	 system	of	arbitration	generates	precedents,	 some	
clearly	do.”	That	they	do	can	be	understood	as	the	situation	around	transnational	commercial	






















or	 a	 specific	 arbitration	 center.	 In	 short,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 international	 arbitrators	 in	
transnational	 commercial	 disputes	 are	 interested	 in	 meeting	 the	 demand	 for	 clear	 rules,	
especially	for	those	curtailing	opportunistic	behavior	for	future	cases.	
Based	 heavily	 on	 international	 arbitration	 case	 law,	 the	 Creeping	 Codification	 that	 is	
represented	by	the	Principles	should	count	on	the	raw	resource	that	is	an	objective	good	faith	
clause	 as	 an	 open	 rule.	 After	 all,	 international	 arbitration,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	
literature,	 does	 contribute	 to	 the	 transnational	 commercial	 law	 as	 codified	 in	 the	 various	
manifestations	of	 the	NLM	(Benson,	1989,	p.	658;	Drahozal,	2009,	p.	1036).13	 In	spite	of	 the	
risks	 of	 judicial	 activism	 that	 could	 be	 enhanced	 at	 an	 international	 level	 by	 international	
arbitrators,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 the	 benefits	 of	 such	 a	 clause	 outweigh	 those.	 It	 is	 an	
appropriate	 strategy	 to	 secure	 to	 a	 reasonable	 degree	 the	 production	 of	 new	 specific	 legal	
rules	 that	 could	 potentially	 aid	 in	 the	 enhancing	 of	 legal	 certainty	 at	 an	 international	 level.	
After	all,	one	important	source	of	rules	and	principles	composing	the	NLM	are	those	which	are	
extrapolated	 from	 individual	 cases	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 commercial	 arbitration	
(Berger,	2019,	para.	73).	
One	 interesting	 illustration	 comes	 from	 international	 arbitration	 practice.	 On	 the	 case	
known	 as	Westland	 Helicopters,	 member	 states	 of	 an	 international	 organization	 were	 held	
subsidiary	 responsible	 for	 certain	 debts,	 which	 were	 initially	 incurred	 by	 the	 organization	
itself,	 the	 Arab	 Organization	 for	 Industrialization	 (henceforth,	 AOI).	 The	 AOI	 later	 on	
defaulted.	The	 reason	underlying	 the	 ruling	was	 that	 such	member	 states	had	not	excluded	
their	 responsibility	 on	 the	 states	 of	 the	 organization.	 The	 core	 of	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	
arbitrators	 was	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith	 -once	 again	 reinforcing	 the	 insight	
regarding	 the	 operational	 meaning	 of	 it.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 appointed	 arbitrators	 were	
confronted	 with	 the	 inquiry	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 there	 is	 a	 subsidiary	 responsibility	 of	
member	 states	 in	 an	 international	 organization	 such	 as	 the	 AOI.	 If	 the	 claimant	 heavily	
discounts	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 organization	 can	 live	 up	 to	 its	 promises,	 which	 raised	
legitimate	 expectations	 at	 some	 point,	 can	 he	 count	 on	 the	 possibility	 to	 sue	 the	 member	
states	 composing	 that	 organization?	 This	 question	 was	 given	 an	 affirmative	 answer.	 The	
arbitrators	 presented	 the	 argument	 that,	 given	 that	 there	 was	 no	 express	 exclusion	 of	
subsidiary	 responsibility	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	 the	 organization,	 the	 parties	 contracting	with	 it	
could	legitimately	expect	such	subsidiary	responsibility.	Parties	can,	in	these	kinds	of	situation,	
rely	on	the	principle	of	objective	good	 faith	as	a	clause	that	compels	parties	 to	refrain	 from	
opportunistic	 behavior.	 Indeed,	 the	 arbitrators	 argued	 that	 such	 rule	 of	 subsidiary	
responsibility	 flows	 from	 the	 general	 clause	 of	 good	 faith	 (International	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce,	1994,	p.	613).	
The	merit	of	this	particular	case	rests	on	the	fact	that	the	general	clause	of	good	faith	can	












timid	 process	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 concretization	 of	 the	 subsidiary	 responsibility	 rule	 of	 an	
international	 organization,	 which	 is	 regulated	 in	 art.	 62	 of	 the	 International	 Law	





the	 particular	 nature	 of	 their	 transaction	 and	 the	 circumstances	 involved,	 in	 particular	 the	
economic	interests	and	expectations	of	the	parties.	Clearly,	the	provision	is	making	an	indirect	




Evidence	 of	 the	 logical	 deduction	 linking	 both	 norms	 is	 presented	 by	 an	 international	
commercial	 arbitration	decision.	 In	 the	 context	of	 a	 contract	of	 land	and	sea	 transportation	
between	 an	 English	 enterprise	 and	 a	 French	 transportation	 company,	 the	 latter	 affirmed	 a	
raise	 in	 the	 price,	 because	 the	 transported	 pieces	 were	 more	 than	 the	 ones	 originally	
intended,	and	more	voluminous.	The	English	enterprise	denied	such	petition.	 It	argued	that,	
indeed,	 the	 parties	 had	 agreed	 on	 eventual	 price	 adjustments,	 but	 only	 to	 those	 related	 to	
changes	 in	 sea	 freight	 tariffs.	 The	 arbitrator	 produced	 the	 award	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 French	
transportation	company.	It	argued,	that	the	conventions	have	to	be	interpreted	in	good	faith,	
meaning	by	this,	in	the	particular	case,	that	each	party	has	an	obligation	to	display	a	behavior	
toward	 the	 other	 party	 which	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 harm	 the	 other	 one.	 This	 implies	 that	
renegotiations	 are	 usual	 in	 international	 economic	 affairs	 in	 case	 of	 abrupt	 changes	 in	









that	 is	 found	 within	 the	 open	 rule	 of	 good	 faith	 has	 been	 traditionally	 built	 through	
concretization	 advanced	 by	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	of	 an	 adjudicative	 kind	 –such	 as	
judges	and	arbitrators	adjudicating	contract	disputes.	











transnational	commercial	 legal	 rules	 that	 is	 the	NLM.	Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	duty	 to	
perform	in	good	faith	is	included	as	a	norm	with	such	a	degree	of	openness	in	the	Principles	
should	 be	 evidence	 enough	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 opportunistic	 behavior	 in	 international	
contracts.	That	 is	 open	 can	be	 explained	by	 the	 economic	 rationale	 that	 there	 is	 a	 constant	
demand	for	those	new	anchors	that	curtail	opportunism	–in	a	way	in	which	the	general	clause	
of	good	 faith,	or	 its	already	concretized	rules,	 cannot.	The	wording	of	 the	principle	must	be	
open-ended,	the	argument	would	follow,	so	international	appointed	arbitrators	can	meet	the	
demand	 of	 newly	 created	 rules	 –potentially	 becoming	 anchors	 in	 the	 future-	 that	 curtail	
opportunism	at	an	international	level.	
Lack	of	an	open	norm	of	good	faith	could	stale	this	process.	Such	is	the	meaning	of	good	
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